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1Demography of Aging
Marc A. Garcia, University of Nebraska–Lincoln
Catherine García University of Southern California
Kyriakos Markides, University of Maine
Introduction 
From 2010-2015, the annual growth rate of older adults was 3.3 per-
cent globally (United- Nations 2017). As the proportion of the world’s 
population continues to age, the increasing number of older adults in 
the population presents significant challenges for policy makers in 
nearly all sectors of society. According to the United Nations Popula-
tion Ageing Report 2017, the global population of adults 60 years and 
older increased more than two-fold from 382 million in 1980 to 962 
million in 2017, and the number is expected to reach nearly 2.1 bil-
lion by 2050 (United Nations 2018). While population aging affects 
nearly every country in the world, the pace of aging has been faster 
is less developed countries than in developed countries (He, Good-
kind, & Kowal 2016). 
Demographic changes in fertility, mortality, and to a lesser extent 
migration, have had profound effects on the age-structure of many 
societies worldwide. These population trends in global aging require 
improved data and analyses to assist societies with social and eco-
nomic shifts in social welfare and health care services, labor markets 
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and retirement, technology, housing, transportation, and intergener-
ational relationships. With an increasingly larger share in the popula-
tion of aging adults in virtually every country throughout the world, it 
is imperative that governments design innovative policies specifically 
aimed at public services to benefit aging individuals and societies. 
In our chapter we present an overview of important issues related 
to global trends in population aging. We organized this review ac-
cording to five key areas: (1) demographic determinants of global ag-
ing; (2) measures and methods; (3) trajectories of population aging; 
(4) theoretical considerations; and (5) future research directions. We 
turn now to the first of these topics. 
Demographic Determinants of Population Aging 
Demographic changes in fertility, mortality, and migration have pro-
found effects on the age-structure of societies. Indeed, the age distri-
bution of a population is determined by the size and history of its birth 
cohorts, age-specific mortality, and migration rates. Each of these de-
mographic processes contributes significantly to population aging. Re-
search has shown that declines in fertility have been the primary en-
gine behind the growth of older populations in many regions of the 
world (He et al. 2016). However, global aging can also be attributed 
to the low levels of mortality which have fueled population aging in 
many countries, and to a lesser extent, to the age patterns of immi-
gration and emigration. The two main approaches developed by de-
mographers for understanding how population aging occurs are the 
following: the stable population model, and population projections. 
The Stable Population Model 
The stable population model is a central tenet of modern demography 
that is used to examine the structure and growth of population aging. 
This model has been described in detail elsewhere (Coale, Demeny, & 
Vaughan 2013; Inaba 2017; Preston, Heuveline, & Guillot 2000; Yu-
suf, Martins, Swanson, Martins, & Swanson 2014). See also Poston’s 
discussion of the stable population model in Chapter 1 of this Hand-
book of Population. 
We begin by introducing important characteristics of this model and 
then turn to its use in population analysis. First, the stable population 
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model assumes that the age distribution of a closed population re-
mains constant over time. This is determined by: 
• a constant number of births every year 
• constant age-specific mortality rates, and 
• closed migration, i.e., no immigration or emigration 
If age-specific fertility and age-specific mortality rates remain con-
stant for a long period of time, and if no migration occurs, then the 
population becomes stationary with an unchanging age distribution, 
neither growing nor declining in size. Under these unique conditions, 
the proportion of the population does not change from one year to 
the next and has a growth rate of zero. The effects of a change on the 
age distribution of a population based on birth and death rates are 
relatively straightforward using the stable population model. As the 
age distribution in a stable population is mathematically determined 
by age-specific fertility and age-specific mortality rates, it is possible 
to estimate the effect of changes in age-specific fertility and/or age-
specific mortality rates on the age structures of a stable population. 
For instance, under the conditions of no migration, it can be shown 
that populations with unvarying fertility and mortality patterns will 
increase, or decrease, in total size at a constant rate, and then acquire 
an age distribution that does not change over time. However, vari-
ation in the age structure of stable populations may arise from dif-
ferences between the fertility and mortality rates. For example, de-
creases in fertility rates, without subsequent changes in mortality 
rates, will inevitably lead to an aging of the population. That is, if the 
number of annual births in a population is less than the number of 
annual deaths, then the population will become older. In contrast, an 
increase in the number of births with a constant mortality schedule 
in the same population leads to a larger proportion of children, and 
hence to a younger population. 
Comparing the hypothetical consequences of differing fertility lev-
els on stable populations with similar life expectancies highlights the 
magnitude of fertility change. For example, in a stable population 
with a life expectancy of 80 years, 7.5 percent of the population will 
be age 65 and older if the gross reproduction rate (GRR) is 2.0. Con-
versely the proportion of older adults will increase to 25.9 percent if 
the GRR decreases to 0.8. 
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Using data from Table 1, similar comparisons in the age structure 
of stable populations under differing fertility/mortality combinations 
can be made. The effects of increasing fertility levels can be seen by 
looking across the rows in this table. Regardless of mortality, repre-
sented here as years of life expectancy, the result of the higher birth 
rates is evident in the proportional change of the younger population. 
However, analyzing the effect of mortality on population aging in a 
stable population is less clear because the results of variations in mor-
tality patterns depend on the specific ages in which mortality changes 
occur. For example, an increase in life expectancy in a cohort will not 
necessarily lead to the aging of a population, and in fact may, coun-
ter-intuitively, lead to a younger population. Indeed, the data in Table 
1 indicate that increases in life expectancy from 40 to 60 years under 
a GRR of 3.0 results in a decrease of the proportion of the population 
age 65 and older. Conversely, an increase in life expectancy from 60 
to 80 years under a GRR of 0.8 results in a significant increase in the 
older population, from 20.1 percent to 25.9 percent. 
Direct and indirect effects of variation in mortality levels on pop-
ulation age structure can be viewed under differing scenarios of in-
creasing life expectancy. In the first scenario, increases in life expec-
tancy due solely to low levels of infant mortality result in a younger 
population. Thus, high survival rates among infants has the same long-
term effects on population age structure as high fertility. In contrast, 
an increase in life expectancy resulting exclusively from lower mor-
tality rates among older adults, i.e., those of the age of 50 and older, 
Table 1. Proportion Age 65 and Older in Stable Populations with Various Combi-
nations of Fertility and Mortality. 
                                                          Gross reproduction rate 
Life Expectancy 0.80 1.00 1.50 2.00 3.00 4.00
20 .165 .134 .085 .058 .032 .020
30 .178 .142 .087 .055 .031 .019
40 .189 .149 .090 .059 .030 .018
50 .198 .154 .091 .060 .030 .017
60 .201 .156 .092 .059 .029 .017
70 .212 .165 .096 .061 .030 .017
80 .259 .202 .119 .075 .036 .021
Source: Coale, Demeny, and Vaughan 2013  
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would result in increases of the proportion of older adults and ulti-
mately lead to an aging population. 
A final scenario worth mentioning is one in which decreases in 
mortality have no effects at all on the age structure of a population. 
This is possible, if a stable population experiences equal decreases in 
mortality rates across all age distributions. Thus, depending on the 
specific ages in which the mortality changes occur, increases in life 
expectancy can result in a population becoming younger, in an aging 
population, or in no change in age composition of a population. 
Population Projections
Population projections are estimates of the growth and composition 
of a population at a future date under a particular set of assumptions. 
The standard approach to population projections uses a cohort-com-
ponent method that accounts for the age and sex structure of a pop-
ulation and its demographic processes, i.e., its fertility rate, mortal-
ity rate, and rate of net migration, through which populations change 
over time. The accuracy of population projections depends on how 
close the actual trends are with respect to the assumptions about fu-
ture births, deaths, and net migration. 
Below we discuss the use of population projections as demographic 
forecasts to assess determinants of population aging. Specifically, we 
examine the effects of alternative assumptions of fertility, life expec-
tancy, and net immigration levels on the future age structure of the 
population of United States. We employ a series of population pro-
jections based on three different component assumptions provided 
by the U.S. Census (Day 1996) to illustrate how population forecasts 
can further our understanding of the determinants of population ag-
ing. For more information, see the discussion of population projec-
tions by Morrison, Smith and Bryan in Chapter 31 of this Handbook 
of Population. 
The baseline projections presented for this exercise begin in 1995, 
when approximately 12.8 percent of the U.S. population was aged 65 
and older, the total fertility rate (TFR) was 2.06, life expectancy was 
75.9 years, and yearly net immigration was 820,000. Applying dif-
ferent assumptions regarding the above components of population 
change, the U.S. Census Bureau estimated the size and age structure 
of the population for 2050. Table 2 presents the various assumptions 
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used for these calculations. Alternative assumptions for the percent 
of the U.S. population projected to be age 65 and older in 2050 are 
shown in Table 3. 
Following the assumption of the middle series for each component 
of change, the population aged 65 and older would increase from 12.8 
percent in 1995 to approximately 20 percent in 2050. Table 3 further 
highlights differences in the projected percentage of the population 
age 65 and older under alternative assumptions. Examining different 
scenarios in which one of the components of population change fol-
lows either a high or a low assumption and the others follow the mid-
dle assumption, allows us to isolate the effect of fertility, life expec-
tancy, and net immigration on population aging. 
Per our previous discussion on the stable population model, high 
levels of fertility with unvarying mortality and migration patterns 
would result in a younger population (17.6 percent age 65 and older), 
whereas a pattern of low fertility with unvarying mortality and 
Table 3. Alternative Assumptions for Percent of U.S. Population Projected to be Age 
65 and Older in 2050 
Assumptionsa  % 65+ 
Middle Series for Fertility, Life Expectancy & Immigration  20.0 
Low Fertility, Middle Life Expectancy & Immigration  22.8 
High Fertility, Middle Life Expectancy & Immigration  17.6 
Low Life Expectancy, Middle Fertility & Immigration  23.3 
High Life Expectancy, Middle Fertility & Immigration  16.5 
High Immigration, Middle Life Expectancy & Fertility  19.4 
Low Immigration, Middle Life Expectancy & Fertility  20.8 
Zero Immigration, Middle Life Expectancy & Fertility  22.3 
a. See text for description of assumptions 
Source: Day 1996. 
Table 2. Fertility, Life Expectancy, and Net Migration Assumptions for 1995-2050. 
   2050 Level of Assumption 
Item  1995  Low  Middle  High 
Fertility  2.055  1,910  2,245  2,580 
Life Expectancy  75.9  74.8  82.0  89.4 
Yearly Net Migration (thousands)  820  300  820  1,370 
Source: Day 1996.  
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migration levels would result in an older population (22.8 percent 
age 65 and older). In contrast, projections for alternative mortality 
assumptions show a larger effect for population aging than alterna-
tive fertility assumptions. For instance, low mortality combined with 
unchanging fertility and net migration patterns would result in the 
largest projected percentage (23.3 percent) of the population age 65 
and older in any of these scenarios, whereas high mortality with con-
stant fertility and net migration patterns results in the smallest per-
centage of older adults in any scenario (16.5 percent). 
It should be noted that differing assumptions regarding immigra-
tion patterns have a relatively small effect on the future age distribu-
tion of the U.S. population compared to the other demographic pro-
cesses. Assuming a low or high annual net migration (20.8 percent and 
19.4 percent, respectively) results in a less than one percent change 
from the middle series (20 percent) in the proportion of adults age 
65 and older. Moreover, an extreme assumption of zero net migration 
results in a marginally older population (22.3 percent) in the propor-
tion of adults age 65 and older. Thus, migration is an ineffective de-
mographic mechanism to slow population aging. 
Both the stable population model and population projections with 
alternative assumptions lead to the same basic conclusions regarding 
the demographic mechanisms of population aging. Decreases in fer-
tility rates lead to an aging population. Conversely, decreases in mor-
tality across all age distributions have relatively little effect on the 
age structure of a population. However, a decrease in mortality rates 
among older adults can significantly lead to population aging. Finally, 
within typical boundaries, net migration has a minimal effect on pop-
ulation aging. The above approaches help us understand past trends 
in population aging and provide a basis for anticipating how future 
trends in population aging may occur. 
Measures and Methods 
Measures of population aging are important because they inform and 
influence our past, current, and future perceptions of demographic 
trends. These measures can tell us if population aging will be ac-
companied by improved health, improved quality of life, and if there 
are sufficient social and economic resources to sustain major popu-
lation changes. Below, we discuss five commonly used indicators of 
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population aging, namely, the population pyramid, the dependency ra-
tio, life expectancy, median age, and the aging index. Each indicator 
has a purpose in describing how a population is aging and can tell us 
a powerful story about each country’s history and future. 
Population Pyramids 
A population pyramid is a graphical illustration of the age and sex 
structure of a population. It shows the percentage or number of peo-
ple in a total population that falls into selected age categories, typi-
cally 5-year groupings, and sex categories, male or female. Population 
pyramids can portray for us many of the past, present, and future de-
mographic trends all in one picture. We can also use population pyra-
mids to analyze the growth, or the decline, of fertility, mortality, and 
migration in any given population. In addition, the shape of a pop-
ulation pyramid can tell us about the number of people being born, 
dying, and moving in and out of a location since they affect the rel-
ative size of all the age and sex groupings for that population. There 
are three basic shapes that describe a population structure, namely, 
the pyramid, i.e., triangular shape; the rectangular shape; and the in-
verted pyramid shape. 
A pyramid-shaped age structure describes a population that is 
young with higher proportions of children due to high levels of fer-
tility and high levels of mortality. Figure 1 is an example of the pyr-
amid-shaped structure, using age and sex for Angola in 2017. An-
gola, located in Southern Africa bordering the Atlantic Ocean, has a 
youthful population with high child mortality rates, the 12th highest in 
the world, and a fertility rate of more than five children per woman 
(United Nations 2017). Angola has lived through long periods of polit-
ical and military instability having gained independence from Portu-
gal in 1975, followed by an eruption of a civil war immediately there-
after that lasted 27 years and ended in 2002 (Tvedten 2018). These 
events have taken a toll on Angola’s people and its economy. The de-
struction caused by the civil war led to the country’s reliance on in-
ternational, non-governmental organizations for the supply of basic 
food and medical care, which have not been enough to support the 
population and its shambled infrastructures (Tvedten 2018). Ango-
la’s population has high levels of child malnutrition and low levels of 
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immunization, which inevitably contribute to excess child mortality 
(Agadjanian & Prata 2003). Angola also faces a high burden of such 
communicable diseases as malaria, tuberculosis, onchocerciasis, respi-
ratory diseases, diarrhea, and HIV/AIDS, which are among the lead-
ing causes of death in Angola (Rosário, Costa, Francisco, & Brito 2017; 
Rosário et al. 2016). These ongoing issues, without significant inter-
vention, will inevitably keep Angola’s population young. 
In contrast to Angola’s pyramidal age structure, the population 
pyramid for the United States in 2017 has a more rectangular shape 
(see Figure 2) with about similar numbers or percentages of people 
in each age group, apart from the oldest age groups, where the bulk 
of mortality occurs. This rectangular shape is indicative of United 
States as a population with a low total fertility rate of 1.8 children per 
woman, and low mortality. In other words, the U.S. is an aging pop-
ulation (United Nations 2017). One of the most important features of 
the United States 356 population pyramid is the effect that the “baby 
boom” generation, i.e., the large number of people born between 1946 
and 1964 after World War II, has had on the older population struc-
ture. The baby boom bulge seen in Figure 2 in the 50 to 70-year age 
range has been moving up the population pyramid in past decades, 
Figure 1. Population Pyramid, Angola, 2017. Source: The World Bank. 
Garcia ,  García ,  &  Markide s  in  P opulat ion  and  So c iety  (2019)       10
leaving the lower part of the working-age population and the base 
narrower. It is also important to note that the top of the pyramid is 
skewed to the right, with more women surviving to older ages than 
men. This is reflective of the mortality trend in the U.S. and most ev-
erywhere that women live longer than men (Vaupel, 2010). The U.S. 
population pyramid also reveals that the United States has experi-
enced a recent decline in fertility, since there is an appreciable deficit 
in the child age groups. Based on this 2017 population pyramid, we can 
predict that the United States will have a larger proportion of older 
adults than younger adults in the coming decades. If fertility rates con-
tinue to drop, it will also contribute to rapid population aging. These 
factors are of major concern for government and policy makers amid 
talks concerning the nation’s ability to support the fast-growing older 
adult population. One of the major consequences of population aging 
is the reduction of the working age population that contributes to the 
support systems of an aging population. However, increasing the size 
of the working age population through international migration can 
offset declines in the working age population and offset the effects of 
overall aging of a population (United Nations 2001). 
For example, the role of international migration to countries such 
as the United States, Canada, and Australia has kept the population 
relatively young because of high rates of youthful immigration. The 
Figure 2. Population Pyramid, United States, 2017. Source: The World Bank. 
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immigration of young workers not only contributes to population 
growth, but also helps support the increasing number of older adults 
through tax revenues. It must be noted that while international mi-
gration may be seen as a solution to population aging, it cannot re-
verse long-term trends in population decline since the number of im-
migrants would need to be very large (Skeldon 2013). 
 A society with an inverted population pyramid has a larger pro-
portion of older adults than younger people to support them, which 
fundamentally alters the structure of the nation’s economy. Figure 3 
shows an inverted population pyramid age structure, using age and 
sex data for Italy in 2017. Italy is a country with a very high life ex-
pectancy of 82.7 years and a profoundly low total fertility rate of 1.35 
births per woman (United Nations 2017). These characteristics of It-
aly are reflected in its population pyramid. On the top panel of Figure 
3, there is a pronounced peak in the 40 to 60-year age range, with an 
aging population approaching the top tier. This peak is followed by 
appreciable declines through the younger age groups, denoting the 
long-run persistence of low fertility. This means that much of the fu-
ture workforce in Italy will be composed of senior citizens, which may 
potentially have serious economic repercussions owing to the declin-
ing physical capacity in an older workforce. These population trends 
pose significant social and economic challenges transitioning from a 
Figure 3. Population Pyramid, Italy, 2017. Source: The World Bank. 
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child-centered society to an older adult-centered society, especially if 
a nation does not have the policy and tax resources to address these 
rapid changes. 
As just illustrated, population pyramids are a useful resource and can 
provide an illustrative visual of a population’s past, current, and future 
demographic trends. The shape of a population pyramid effectively com-
municates whether a population is young or old, and it can shed light 
on the extent of development and other aspects of the population. For 
more information and other examples, see Poston’s discussion of pop-
ulation pyramids in Chapter 1 of this Handbook of Population. 
Dependency Ratios 
The dependency ratio is a summary measure of age composition. It 
represents the proportion of a population that falls in the age cate-
gories that are traditionally thought to be economically dependent. 
The ratios are based on a division of three age groups: children (0-14 
years), the working age population (15-64 years), and the older pop-
ulation (65 years and older). Although this measure is standard in 
many demographic indicators of population aging, there are defini-
tional variations on who is considered to be a dependent. For example, 
traditional measures of dependency do not take into account societ-
ies in which persons enter the workforce before age 15, and/or those 
who stay working beyond age 65 years. Changing the lower or upper 
limit of these working ages can affect the dependency ratios appre-
ciably. Nonetheless, dependency ratios are a useful tool for examin-
ing the potential number of persons available to support each older 
or younger person. 
The young, or youth, dependency ratio represents the number of 
children per 100 workers. Similarly, the old age, or aged, dependency 
ratio is the number of people aged 65 and older per 100 workers. The 
sum of the young and old dependency ratios equals the total depen-
dency ratio, i.e., the ratio of dependent people, young and old, per 
100 persons in the working ages. With respect to aging, this measure 
provides a straightforward way for comparing the relative number of 
older people in various populations across time periods. These num-
bers can be used to determine different patterns of demand on social 
and economic resources such as the allocation of tax dollars, health 
care, caregiving, and the educational system. 
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Figure 4 shows the young, old, and total dependency ratios for se-
lected countries in Africa, Asia, Europe, and North America. Among 
the countries shown, the country with the highest total dependency 
ratio is Angola, which has 97 children and older adults for every 100 
working-age citizens. In contrast, the country with the lowest depen-
dency ratio is China, which has 40 children and older adults for ev-
ery 100 working-age citizens. Countries such as the United States, Ja-
pan, and Germany have ratios in between. With continued interest in 
the aging population, there are stark differences in the old-age depen-
dency ratio by country that deserve closer examination. For instance, 
Japan has the highest old-age dependency ratio in the world, mean-
ing that Japan has a very large proportion of its population that is re-
tired. This affects the demand for economic, medical, and long-term 
care services, both formal and informal. Italy and Germany also face 
similar issues related to a high old-age dependency ratio that will de-
mand the need to reevaluate welfare strategies and health care for 
the elderly. 
Figure 4. Dependency and Support Ratios, 2017. Source: The World Bank. 
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Life Expectancy 
Life expectancy is often used as an indicator of the quality of life, 
health, and social development of a population. Life expectancy is 
closely linked to health conditions, which are an integral part of de-
velopment in a country. Life expectancy refers to the average length 
of time to be lived by a group of people born in the same year, as-
suming that age-specific mortality levels remain constant. Life ex-
pectancy is calculated from actual mortality data in a single year and 
describes what would happen to a hypothetical group if they moved 
through their lives experiencing the mortality rates observed for the 
country in any given year. Table 4 shows the life expectancies of se-
lected countries classified in 2015 as high-income, middle-income, and 
low-income. It is probably not surprising that the high-income coun-
tries shown in the table, namely, Japan, Italy, and the United States, 
have the highest life expectancies compared to the middle- and low-
income countries. Women in Japan have the highest life expectancy 
in the world at 87 years. The high life expectancies observed among 
the high-income countries are reflected in their success of handling 
Table 4. Life Expectancies Among High-, Middle-, and Low-Income Countries. 
 Life Expectancy at Birth,  Life Expectancy at Age 65,  
 2015a    2010-2015b 
 Men  Women  Men  Women 
High Income 
    Italy 80.3 84.9 18.6 22.0 
    Japan 80.8 87.0 19.0 23.9 
    United States 76.3 81.2 18.0 20.6 
Middle Income 
    Brazil 71.6 78.9 16.3 19.5 
    Mexico 74.5 79.4 17.9 19.7 
    Russia 65.9 76.7 12.9 17.1 
Low Income 
    Afghanistan 62.0 64.6 12.2 13.4 
    Ethiopia 63.2 66.9 13.8 14.9 
    Uganda 57.4 61.8 13.2 14.3 
a. Source: The World Bank; 
b. Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population 
Division (2017). World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision   
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noncommunicable diseases since fewer men and women are dying be-
fore their 60th birthday from heart disease and stroke (World Health 
Organization 2014). 
At the other end of the scale, low-income countries, such as Uganda, 
have lower life expectancies than the high-income countries. In 
Uganda, for example, their high infant mortality rates contribute to 
keeping the population younger (Daumerie & Madsen, 2010). 
Since we are interested in aging populations, we also included in 
Table 4 a measure of population aging such as life expectancy at age 
65, which is the average number of years that a person at age 65 can 
be expected to live, assuming that age-specific mortality levels re-
main constant. This indicator can help governments make informed 
decisions about retirement age, benefits, and health care costs. As 
observed earlier with life expectancy at birth, high-income countries 
have the highest life expectancies at age 65, with women in Japan 
having the longest life expectancy at age 65, of 23.9 more years. This 
means that women in Japan who reach the age of 65 can be expected, 
on average, to live an additional 23.9 years, that is, they will live un-
til approximately age 89. Note that life expectancy at age 65 is larger 
than that observed for life expectancy at birth. In the case of women 
in Japan, their life expectancy at birth is 87 years, while their life ex-
pectancy at age 65 is approximately 89 years. This is due to selective 
mortality. That is, life expectancy for individuals at age 65 is condi-
tional on their survival to age 65 and does not account for mortality 
for those younger than age 65. 
With the steady increase of life expectancy around the world, and 
the growing proportion of the older population, there is also a need to 
capture the quality and quantity of the remaining years lived. Healthy 
life expectancy is one such measure that captures both the quality and 
quantity of remaining years lived by dividing life expectancy into life 
spent in different states of health. Healthy life expectancy refers to 
the number of years that an individual may expect to live in a healthy 
state, i.e., living without disability or morbidity. This is calculated us-
ing the Sullivan method (Sullivan 1971), also known as Sullivan health 
expectancy, which integrates age-specific data on the prevalence of the 
population in healthy and unhealthy states, with age-specific mortal-
ity information. Sullivan health expectancies have been used to pro-
vide results for populations from over 50 countries worldwide (Jag-
ger & Robine 2011). 
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Figure 5 provides Sullivan health expectancy data at age 65 for se-
lected countries in Europe, by sex, in 2016. The figure shows the to-
tal life expectancy at age 65 divided into healthy and unhealthy states. 
For example, females in France have a life expectancy at age 65 of 
23.7 years. Out of those 23.7 years, they can expect, on average, to 
spend 10.6 years of their total life expectancy at age 65 in a healthy 
state. To gain a more impactful meaning of these numbers, we take 
the healthy life expectancy value for a country and divide it by the to-
tal life expectancy value for the country to obtain a proportion that an 
individual can expect to live in a healthy state. In the case of France, 
we divide 10.6 into 23.7, for a ratio of 0.45, which represents the pro-
portion of remaining life after age 65 spent in good health. Thus, at 
age 65 French women can expect to spend 45 percent of their remain-
ing life in a healthy state. In contrast, Slovakian women at age 65 can 
expect to spend 22 percent of their remaining life in a healthy state. 
These percentages are useful in making cross-population compari-
sons. Comparing women in France and Slovakia, we can say that Slo-
vakians are spending a lower proportion of their life after age 65 in a 
healthy state compared to the French. 
Figure 5.  Healthy Life Years and Life Expectancy at Age 65, 2016. Source: Euro-
stat (2018). http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/en/web/products-datasets/-/TEPSR_SP320 
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 Median Age 
The median age of a population is a measure of central tendency that 
divides a population into two age groups of the same size, such that 
one-half the total population is younger than the median age, and the 
other one-half is older. The median is the midpoint separating these 
two halves. The median age is a useful measure of undertaking cross-
population comparisons when age distributions are not symmetrical 
because the median is less affected by outliers and skewed data. How-
ever, a major limitation of median age data is that they do not give 
details of the age distribution. Table 5 shows a range of median ages 
for selected countries. As most indicators in this chapter have shown, 
Japan is the oldest country in the world and has a median age of 47.3 
years. Angola, among the youngest countries in the world, has a much 
lower median age of 15.9 years. 
Aging Index 
The aging index is the number of persons 60 years old or older per 
one-hundred persons under age 15. This measure is a straightforward 
indicator of the relative number of older persons in a population for 
every 100 children. In 2000, a few countries such as Japan, Germany, 
and Italy had aging indexes above 100 (Gavrilov & Heuveline 2003). 
By 2030, however, it is expected that all developed countries will have 
Table 5. Median age, 2017. 
 Total  Male  Female 
Japan 47.3 46.0 48.7
Italy 45.5 44.4 46.5
Germany 47.1 46.0 48.2
United States 38.1 36.8 39.4
Russia 39.6 36.6 42.5
China 37.4 36.5 38.4
Mexico 28.3 27.2 29.4
Honduras 23.0 22.6 23.3
Kenya 19.7 19.6 19.9
Angola 15.9 15.4 16.3
Source: The World Factbook, Central Intelligence Agency, United States.  
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aging indexes above 100 (Kinsella & Phillips 2005), with some coun-
tries, such as Japan, having an aging index exceeding 200 (Gavrilov & 
Heuveline 2003). Conversely, in developing countries, aging indexes 
are much lower since their 363 populations are much younger. The ag-
ing index is a telling measure of the challenges societies face in their 
allocation of resources to support an increasingly aging population. 
Trajectories of Population Aging
Demographic Transition 
The classical model of the demographic, or epidemiological, transi-
tion refers to the process in which a population characterized by high 
fertility and mortality transitions into a population with low fertil-
ity and low mortality. The demographic transition is one of the most 
important historical changes that have affected both the population 
growth rate and the age structure of a country. 
According to Omran’s (1971) epidemiological transition model, there 
are three key stages of transition. The first stage, called the “age of 
pestilence and famine,” is characterized by populations having high 
and fluctuating mortality rates among children and adults because of 
infectious and deficiency diseases. Throughout this stage, populations 
have variable life expectancy with a low average life span (about 20 
to 40 years). Further, the population’s age structure is young with a 
pyramid shape that consists of a larger proportion of children at the 
base and very few older people at the top, due to high rates of mor-
tality and fertility. Consequently, natural increase, i.e., births minus 
deaths, is low, and population growth is slow. 
The second stage, called the “age of receding pandemics,” is marked 
by high rates of fertility, declining mortality rates, and population 
growth because populations experience improvements in nutrition, 
hygiene, sanitation, social programs and medical technologies that 
reduce the incidence of infectious and deficiency diseases. Average 
life expectancy also increases in this stage. This transition is accom-
panied by a shift in the population age distribution, as infectious and 
deficiency diseases decline, and deaths from chronic degenerative dis-
eases increase at older ages. The population age structure, however, 
remains young, but there is an increasing proportion of older adults 
as mortality rates decrease and lifespan increases. 
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In the third stage, called the “age of degenerative and man-made 
diseases,” noncommunicable diseases, also known as chronic diseases, 
become the primary cause of death for the populations. Infectious 
and deficiency diseases become rare or nonexistent at this point. This 
stage is characterized by low and stable rates of infant mortality and 
increased survival into adulthood and old age. Average life expectancy 
becomes much higher and tends to be greater than 50 years of age. 
The population age structure also starts to become older, an impor-
tant determinant of population aging. 
Although Omran proposed three key stages, some demographers 
and epidemiologists have suggested that there is a fourth stage, “the 
age of delayed degenerative diseases” stage, in which prosperity and 
medicine are contributing factors to the postponement of senescence, 
or delay in aging (Olshansky & Ault 1986; Vaupel 2010). In this stage, 
death rates fall across the age range, showing a survival curve that 
becomes more “rectangular” in shape since the distribution of deaths 
have shifted to the right and become more compressed (Wilmoth 
2000). Other characteristics in this stage include low mortality and 
low fertility rates, a flattening of population growth, and an age struc-
ture that becomes old. 
The demographic transition reflects differential risks of cause-spe-
cific mortality that explain the persistent disparities in the pace of im-
provements in survival across the world’s populations. For example, 
countries that have reduced the risk of childhood death from infec-
tious and deficiency diseases have achieved more rapid gains in lon-
gevity and advanced 365 further though their demographic transition 
compared to countries that continue to face large burdens from infec-
tious and deficiency diseases. 
Global Population Aging
 Globally, the number of older adults aged 60 and older is growing 
faster than the numbers of people in any other age group. In 2015, 
there were 48 percent more people aged 60 years and older worldwide 
than there were in 2000. And by 2050, the number of older adults 
is expected to more than triple since 2000 (United Nations 2015). In 
contrast, the number of children, i.e., persons under age 10, and ad-
olescents and youth, i.e., persons aged 10-24 years, is projected to 
change by 11 percent from 2000 to 2050 (United Nations 2015). The 
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number of adults (aged 25- 59 years), however, is growing faster than 
the number of children, but not as fast as the older adult population 
aged 60 and older. In 2015, there were 29 percent more adults than 
there were in 2000; and by 2050, the number of adults is projected 
to increase by 62 percent (United Nations 2015). Although the global 
trends are alarming, the pace of these trends has not been shared uni-
formly across the world. A distinct feature of global population ag-
ing is its uneven speed across world regions and development levels. 
The data in Table 6 show the percentage of older adults aged over 
60 years and 80 years for the world, development groups, regions, and 
income groups in 2000, 2015, 2030, and 2050. The data for 2015 are 
based on estimates from national census and surveys, and the data for 
2030 and 2050 are projections based on certain assumptions regard-
ing future demographic behavior. We selected these particular popu-
lations to illustrate the diversity in patterns of population aging. The 
percentage of adults aged 80 years and older is included in this ta-
ble 366 because of the growing interest of social and health policy re-
searchers of the “oldest-old” population. 
Table 6. Percent of Population Over Age 60 years and 80 years for the World, Development Groups, 
Regions, and Income Groups, 2000, 2015, 2030, and 2050. 
                                                                               60+                                                    80+ 
Area 2000 2015 2030 2050 2000 2015 2030 2050
World 9.9 12.3 16.5 21.5 1.2 1.7 2.4 4.5
Development Groups 
   More Developed regions 19.5 23.9 29.2 32.8 3.1 4.7 6.6 9.9
   Less Developed regions 8.0 10.7 15.9 22.7 0.7 1.2 1.8 4.4
   Least Developed regions 5.1 5.5 6.7 9.8 0.4 0.5 0.6 1.1
Regions 
   Africa 5.2 5.4 6.3 8.9 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.9
   Asia 8.6 11.6 17.2 24.6 0.8 1.4 2.1 4.9
   Europe 20.3 23.9 29.6 34.2 2.9 4.7 6.3 10.1
   Latin America and the Caribbean 8.1 11.2 16.8 25.5 1.0 1.6 2.6 5.7
   Oceania 13.4 16.5 20.2 23.3 2.2 2.9 4.3 6.4
   North America 16.2 20.8 26.4 28.3 3.2 3.8 5.6 8.6
Income Groups 
   High-Income Countries 18.0 22.1 27.7 31.9 2.9 4.3 6.2 9.6
   Upper-Middle-Income Countries 9.2 13.4 21.2 30.5 0.9 1.6 2.6 7.0
   Lower-Middle-Income Countries 6.9 8.1 11.2 16.5 0.6 0.8 1.1 2.3
   Low-Income Countries 5.0 5.2 5.8 8.3 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.8
Source: United Nations (2015). World Population Prospects: The 2015 Revision. 
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The first comparison in Table 6 is between the more developed re-
gions, i.e., Europe, Northern America, Australia, New Zealand, and Ja-
pan, the less developed regions, i.e., Africa, much of Asia, Latin Amer-
ica and the Caribbean, and the group of least developed regions, i.e., 
which refers to much of Africa (United Nations 2015). In general, 
countries in the “more developed” regions have higher standards of 
living, higher levels of income, higher life expectancy, and lower birth 
rates than countries in the “less and least developed” regions. Al-
though there is a stark divide among world societies, it is clear that 
these characteristics influence differences in population aging. Be-
tween 2000 and 2050, population aging is expected to progress much 
more rapidly in the more developed areas than in the less and least de-
veloped areas. In 2000, the percent over age 60 in developed regions 
was 19.5 compared to 8.0 in the less developed regions, and 5.1 in the 
least developed regions (United Nations 2015). Between 2000 and 
2050, it is anticipated that the proportion of older adults will nearly 
double in developed regions, to 32.8 percent, and nearly triple in the 
less developed regions, to 22.7 percent, and nearly double in the least 
developed regions, to 9.8 percent (United Nations 2015). In the next 
comparison, we document further variation within both the more and 
less developed regions. 
The pattern of population aging is very similar in Asia and Latin 
America and the Caribbean over the 50 years between 2000 and 2050. 
In both regions, the percentage of adults aged 60 was modest in 2000, 
but extremely rapid aging is projected to occur over the subsequent 50 
years as the percentage of the population over age 60 years nearly tri-
ples (United Nations 2015). The primary reason for anticipating rapid 
population aging after 2000 is the sharp decline in birth rates that be-
gan in the last three decades of the 20th century in these regions. In the 
1960s, the total fertility rate (TFR) was above 6 children per woman 
in two-thirds of the countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, but 
by 2000-2005, the TFR in the region was estimated at 2.6 children 
per woman (United Nations 2015). Similarly, in Asia, the total fertil-
ity rate in the 1960-1965 period was about 6 children per woman and 
2.4 by 2000-2005 (United Nations 2015). Africa, in contrast, has yet 
to experience population aging with only 5.2 percent of its popula-
tion over age 60 years in 2000 (United Nations 2015). Birth rates in 
most of Africa remained high by world standards throughout the 20th 
century, and life expectancy has increased slowly compared to Asia 
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and Latin America. Due to the HIV/AIDS epidemic in the 1990s, some 
African countries have experienced large declines in life expectancy, 
and for the continent as a whole, life expectancy was lower in 2000 
than in 1990. However, some of the greatest gains in life expectancy 
between 2000 and 2015 were experienced in Africa due to improve-
ments in child survival and access to antiretrovirals for the treatments 
of HIV. These demographic trends suggest that Africa will experience 
its demographic transition within the 21st century, with the TFR per-
haps declining to 2.9 by 2050-2055. Under this scenario, the percent-
age of older adults in Africa’s population will nearly double between 
2000 and 2050, from 5.2 to 8.9 (United Nations 2015). However, the 
population of Africa in 2050 would still be younger than the popula-
tion of the more developed regions was in 2000. 
In both Europe and North America, older adults constitute a large 
share of the population. In both regions in 2015, one in five persons 
was aged 60 years and older (United Nations 2015). This is pro-
jected to continue to rise such that, in 2050, older adults will account 
for one in three people (United Nations 2015). Europe is projected 
to have the oldest population of any region in the coming decades 
(United Nations 2015). These population trends are not new in these 
regions. In fact, these regions have been aging for decades, with some 
countries in these regions aging for over a century. While declining 
fertility has been a significant factor for population aging for these 
regions, population aging is also a result of extended longevity. In 
both Europe and North America, living to age 60 or age 80 is no lon-
ger a rarity. However, increasing longevity has led to new challenges 
such as the health and disability patterns of older populations, the 
economic resources available to older adults, and health care costs, 
to name only a few. 
The last comparison in Table 6 is between income groups. Older 
adults comprised 22.1 percent of the population of high-income coun-
tries in 2015, 13.4 percent of upper-middle-income countries, 8.1 per-
cent of lower-middle-income countries, and 5.2 percent of low-in-
come countries. Across income groups, older adults are projected to 
increase significantly by 2050. Older adults will comprise 31.9 per-
cent of the population of high-income countries in 2050, 30.5 per-
cent of upper-middle-income countries, 16.5 percent of lower-middle-
income countries, and 8.3 percent of low-income countries (United 
Nations 2015). 
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Theoretical Issues 
Migration and Population Aging 
Patterns of migration, i.e., in-migration and out-migration, may not 
necessarily be drivers of change in the age structure of a population. 
For example, if there was no variation in the age of the migrants, and 
they had fertility and mortality profiles similar to those of the receiv-
ing population, then in-migration would only affect the size of the 
population. However, migration is an important factor in population 
aging for some countries (Sudharsanan & Bloom 2018). Immigration 
may contribute to the decline of population aging, i.e. in Canada and 
Europe, because immigrants tend to be younger and have higher fer-
tility than the receiving population. In contrast, emigration of work-
ing-age adults may contribute to increases in population aging as older 
adults tend to migrate less than younger adults. Population aging may 
also be accelerated by immigration of retirees from other nations and 
the return migration of older emigrants as observed in some Carib-
bean countries (Gavrilov & Heuveline 2003). Despite the age selec-
tivity of immigrants, the effects of migration on population aging are 
generally larger on the age composition of smaller populations due 
to a higher proportion of immigrants. Additional insights about the 
association between migration patterns and population aging can be 
attained by considering two scenarios, namely, the effects of internal 
migration in the United States on regional differences in age distri-
bution; and replacement migration in developed countries as a solu-
tion to population aging. 
Migration and Population Aging in the United States
In 2010, 40.3 million adults or 13 percent of the population in the 
United States was aged 65 and older (West, Cole, Goodkind, & He 
2014). Geographically, 11 states had over one million adults aged 65 
and older. However, states with the largest number of older adults are 
not necessarily those with the highest percentages of elderly. For in-
stance, the state of California had the greatest number of older adults, 
but it is ranked 46th among the 50 states and District of Columbia with 
regard to the percentage of its older population. Conversely. West Vir-
ginia had the second highest percentage of older adults, yet is ranked 
35th in terms of population 65 and older. 
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The percentage of the state population of age 65+ and old varied 
among the states from a high of 17.3 percent in Florida to a low of 7.7 
percent in Alaska (West et al. 2014). Differences in the percentage of 
older adults in these extremes are mainly attributable to in-migration 
patterns. Florida is a desirable retirement destination which may at-
tract a disproportionate number of older adults. Conversely, Alaska, 
historically, has attracted a disproportionate number of young adults 
for college, military, and employment (Alaska Department of Labor 
and Workforce Development 2015). In addition to Florida and West 
Virginia, Maine, and Pennsylvania were the only other states with 15 
percent or more of their populations aged 65 and older. In contrast, 
Colorado, Georgia, Texas, and Utah comprised the remaining states 
with older populations under 11 percent. Furthermore, Alaska, Ne-
vada, Idaho, Colorado, Arizona, Georgia, Utah, and South Carolina in 
the West and South regions experienced the fastest growth rates, from 
30.2 percent to 53.9 percent, between 2000 and 2010. Conversely, 
North Dakota, Iowa, Massachusetts, Nebraska, Kansas, New York, New 
Jersey, and Pennsylvania all experienced a relatively low growth of 
under 7 percent of their older populations, and Rhode Island and the 
District of Columbia experienced declines. 
Following the above patterns, one might ask what accounts for the 
growth or decline of older populations by state and region. The answer 
to the question is that older adults are less likely to move than their 
younger counterparts. Indeed, research shows that adults aged 65 
and older are three times less likely to be mobile than adults aged 18-
64 (Ihrke, Faber, & Koerber 2011). While residential mobility at older 
ages is not uncommon, relocation is more prevalent among adults who 
are retired, in poor health, have higher levels of income/wealth, and 
reside in urban areas (Cagney & Cornwell 2018; Sergeant & Ekerdt 
2008; Taylor, Morin, Cohn, & Wang 2008). Older adults who do move 
disproportionately tend to do so within their state and tend to “age in 
place” (Cagney & Cornwell 2018), while a disproportionate number 
of younger people move out. As migration characteristics largely de-
pend on age, those states, or regions, in which out-migration exceeds 
in-migration over a continual period will tend to have older popula-
tions. In recent decades, the Northeast and Midwest regions of the 
United States have experienced significant net out-migration which 
has resulted in a large growth in the percentage of the population aged 
65 and older. Conversely, regions in the South, with the exception of 
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Florida, and the West, have experienced significant net in-migration 
which has resulted in younger populations. 
Replacement Migration. 
As we have noted above, immigration tends to have a smaller effect on 
the age structure of a population. However, from a demographic point 
of view, it is a useful exercise to examine for developed countries the 
volume of in-migration that would be required to offset population 
decline and population aging resulting from low rates of fertility and 
mortality. Focusing on these population trends, the United Nations 
(2001) provided this information for eight countries, namely, France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, United 
Kingdom and United States, and for two regions, namely, Europe and 
the European Union. The title of the U.N. publication is “Replacement 
Migration: Is it a Solution to Declining and Ageing Populations?” 
The motivating factor behind this report was the potential in-
creased burden placed on working age adults, i.e., those aged 15 to 
64 years old, to support the older population, i.e., those aged 65 and 
older. The population indicator of interest was the potential support 
ratio (PSR). The PSR is defined as the ratio of population aged 15-64 
years to the population aged 65 years and older. (Also, see Poston’s 
discussion of the PSR in Chapter 1 of this Handbook.) The basic ques-
tion involved the association between PSRs in 2050 and alternative 
scenarios according to the annual number of net migrants entering 
each selected country or region between 1995 and 2050. Therefore, 
the analysis compared the age distribution PSRs resulting from var-
ious population projections based on alternative assumptions of net 
immigration. 
Table 7 summarizes the results of alternative population projec-
tions for Japan, the United States, and the European Union. Baseline 
information on PSRs in 1950 and 1995 are provided for each country 
and region in addition to selected outcomes of four alternative projec-
tions in 2050. Each estimate is based on the fertility and mortality as-
sumptions behind the medium variant of the standard United Nations 
population projections. The four alternatives for migration are: 1) me-
dium variant projection; 2) zero migration after 1995; 3) migration 
required to maintain PSR of 3.0 before 2050; 4) migration required to 
maintain PSR at 2000 level. The outcomes for each projection are: 1) 
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PSR in 2050; 2) average annual number of immigrants between 2000 
and 2050; 3) percent of the 2050 population composed of post-2000 
immigrants and their descendants; and 4) the ratio of the total popu-
lation in 2050 to total population in 2000. 
In Japan, the PSR declined from 12.1 to 4.0 between 1950 and 2000 
and is projected to further decline to 1.7 in 2050 under the medium 
variant projection assumption. Under the assumption of zero migra-
tion, the medium projection results in a 2050 population that is ap-
proximately 20 percent smaller than the 2000 population and is un-
affected by immigrants from other countries. However, if Japan were 
to use immigration to maintain a PSR of 3.0 in 2050, they would need 
Table 7. Population Data and Indexes for Japan, European Union, and the United States in 2050 
Under Alternative Demographic Scenarios. 
Country and Indicator  1950  2000                    2050 
   Proj. 1e  Proj. 2f  Proj. 3g  Proj. 4h 
Japan 
   1. PSRa 12.1 4 1.7 1.7 3.0 4.8
   2. Average Immigrationb    0  0  1,897  10,471 
   3. % Immigrationc    0  0  54.2  87.2 
   4. Population Increased    0.83  0.83  1.81  6.46 
European Union 
   1. PSRa  7.0  4.1  2.0  1.9  3.0  4.3 
   2. Average Immigrationb    270  0  3,073  13,480 
   3. % Immigrationc    6.2  0  40.2  74.7 
   4. Population Increased    0.88  0.83  1.39  3.27 
United States 
   1. PSRa  7.8  5.3  2.8  2.6  3.0  5.2 
   2. Average Immigrationb    760  0  816  10,777 
   3. % Immigrationc    16.8  0  17.4  72.7 
   4. Population Increased    1.25  1.04  1.26  3.83 
a. PSR = Potential Support Ratio (pop. 15-64/pop. 65+). 
b. Average Immigration = Average annual volume of immigration in 1000s, 2000- 2050. 
c. % Immigration = Percent of population composed of post-2000 immigrants and their 
descendants. 
d. Population Increase = Ratio of total population to total population in 2000. 
e. Projection 1 - Median variant 
f. Projection 2 - Median variant, except zero migration 
g. Projection 3 - Maintain PSR of 3.0 
h. Projection 4 - Maintain PST existing in 1995 
Source: United Nations 2000. 
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to admit an average of 1.9 million immigrants per year until 2050. 
The fourth scenario, maintaining the same PSR as 1995, demonstrates 
that a policy aimed at countering population aging through interna-
tional immigration is highly improbable. Attempts to prevent popula-
tion aging after 1995 through replacement migration would lead to a 
2050 population that would be approximately eight times larger than 
the 1995 population, and one in which 87.2 percent were migrants or 
their descendants. 
Results for the United States and the European Union are also pre-
sented in Table 7. In both analyses, it is astonishing what little dif-
ference the effect of projected immigration has on population aging 
compared to that of zero migration. Similar to Japan, the volume of 
future immigration required by the United States and the European 
Union to prevent population aging after 1995 is considered to be un-
realistic. The consequence of attempting to stop population aging via 
immigration would result in an increase in population density of mi-
grants and their descendants which would likely transform the culture 
of the receiving area, a result which is clearly unacceptable give the 
current political climate towards immigration. As populations cannot 
grow indefinitely at a rapid pace, this solution would only postpone 
the ultimate need to adapt to the inevitable aging of the population. 
The medium projection indicates a PSR of 2.8 in 2050 for the United 
States. As the U.S. is expected to sustain near replacement fertility lev-
els over the twenty-first century, maintaining a PSR of 3.0 would only 
require an average immigration level 20 percent greater than the ex-
pected one. Conversely, in order to keep the PSR constant at 3.0, the 
European Union would require an annual level of immigration 3 times 
greater than that occurring in 2000. 
Challenges due to declining and aging populations have led to the 
question of whether replacement migration can be used as a solution 
to offset population aging. However, efforts to use replacement mi-
gration are unlikely to gain significant political support owing to the 
backlash in many countries regarding the increasing of the immigrant 
populations. Significantly increasing the proportion of immigrants in 
developed countries would surely generate concerns about environ-
mental consequences and cultural challenges (Grant 2001; Meyerson 
2001). Moreover, the magnitude of sustained migration required to 
significantly alter future patterns of population aging is not only stag-
gering but also most unrealistic. 
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Future Research Directions 
The demography of aging is the analysis of the changes experienced 
by individuals and societies as they age over time (Weir, Waite, Wong, 
& Freedman 2018). Since the last edition of this Handbook of Popula-
tion was published in 2005, there have been great advances in the col-
lection of international and longitudinal data sets that focus on aging. 
These include the development of harmonized international studies 
which use socio-demographic, economic, and health measures on in-
dividuals and households that are comparable to the Health and Re-
tirement Study (HRS) in the United States. Some of these interna-
tional data sets include the Mexican Health and Aging Study (MHAS), 
the Costa Rican Longevity and Healthy Aging Study (CRELES), the 
English Longitudinal Study of Aging (ELSA), the Survey of Health and 
Retirement in Europe (SHARE), the Irish Longitudinal Study on Age-
ing (TILDA), the Korean Longitudinal Study of Aging (KLoSA), the In-
donesian Family Life Survey (IFLS), the Japanese Study of Aging and 
Retirement (JSTAR), the Chinese Health and Retirement Longitudinal 
Study (CHARLS), and the Longitudinal Aging Study in India (LASI). 
These longitudinal data sets include large cohorts of older adults that 
have allowed multidisciplinary researchers to conduct cross-national 
comparisons to expand the understanding of the social, economic, po-
litical, and health implications of population aging across the world. 
Some of the more recent developments across these data sets include 
measures of social networks, sexuality, biological and functional mea-
sures of health, and genetics that better describe the specific chal-
lenges and underlying mechanisms of aging faced by individuals. An-
other advancement is that it is possible to combine these survey data 
with administrative/medical records that provide a more comprehen-
sive picture of aging and health than researchers have been able to 
develop previously. These data linkages combine self-reports and ob-
jective historical measures to create a rich source of individual infor-
mation on health care use, health conditions, life events, and medi-
cal expenditures, which will invariably be important for public policy 
makers in trying to address the challenges of population aging. 
The collection of population studies and innovative measures in 
aging research from different regions around the world, particularly 
developing nations, provides new opportunities for collaborative 
work across disciplines. Historically, social scientists have focused on 
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individual domains specific to their field: demographers on popula-
tion trajectories; economists on occupation, retirement, and pension; 
epidemiologists on health-related factors; and sociologists on family 
dynamics. However, each of these domains is associated with the oth-
ers and cannot be fully understood without the recognition that aging 
is a multi-faceted process. 
Therefore, multidisciplinary approaches aimed at the development 
of theoretical advances informed by innovative technological meth-
ods and measures can lead to better informed policy recommenda-
tions for dealing with population aging. In our opinion, this is one of 
the important and policy-relevant foci for future research in the de-
mography of aging.   
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